It is increasingly common for the EU to include extraterritorial GHG emissions within controversial and on more than one occasion the EU has been forced to back down.
(environmental effectiveness) emphasized the economic consequences that the decision to include aviation in the ETS would entail for the EU. In keeping with a 'logic of consequences', the Aviation Working Group looked beyond existing normative frameworks and shared perceptions of the common good, to focus in significant measure upon the issue of how best to protect the EU's economic interests.
The Working Group's explicit emphasis upon these more detailed considerations, including clearly self-serving criteria in place of the high-flown language of responsibility, led it to identify and implicitly to favour a new option for encompassing aviation in the ETS. 10 This was geographically broader than the previous options under consideration in that it included all the en-route emissions of both EU-departing and EU-arriving flights. In relation to a flight from San Francisco to London where only 9% of the emissions occur within EU airspace, this proposal would now include the entire en-route emissions in the ETS.
This shift in the mode of framing the decision to include aviation in the ETS was firmed up when in 2008 the EU adopted a Directive to include international aviation in the ETS. 11 Consistent with the position of the Aviation Working Group, this endorsed a broad geographical approach, providing for the inclusion of the worldwide emissions of both EU-departing and EU-arriving flights. This was subject to the possibility of amending the Directive if global agreement on reducing the GHG emissions from aviation was reached. Likewise, it was open to the EU to exclude emissions from EU-arriving flights where the country of departure had itself adopted (EU-equivalent) measures to reduce the climate change impact of EU-bound flights.
12 inclusion of aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community', section 6.3. 10 The Aviation Working Group reports that this new option was put forward by the low cost airlines and environmental NGOs. However, this option had already been identified in the preliminary impact assessment prepared by the Commission. See SEC (2005) 1184, 'Reducing the Climate Change Impact of Aviation ', p. 28. 11 Directive 2008 Directive /101 [2009 OJ L8/3.
As has been widely reported, the EU's Aviation Directive provoked a storm of protest from many within the aviation industry and from a significant number of developed and developing country governments. 13 The EU's opponents took issue with the unilateral and 'extraterritorial' nature of the Directive, arguing that it would inhibit future multilateral cooperation on climate change and that it infringed unduly upon the sovereignty of non-EU states. They objected also to the fact that the revenue raised as a result of the EU's decision to include international aviation in the ETS was to accrue to the EU Member States and was available for use at their discretion. They also claimed that the measure was incompatible with the principle of CBDR in that it was premised upon the equal treatment of developed and developing countries and their airlines.
Much opposition to the EU's Aviation Directive was couched in righteous language.
The logic of consequences that was favoured by the Aviation Working Group, which sought to shape the Aviation Directive in a manner that was economically beneficial for the EU, was contested principally on the basis of a logic of appropriateness. The EU's opponents emphasized the seriousness of the threat posed by climate change and acknowledged the grave importance of tackling this pressing global problem. But they similarly expressed their clear and unshakeable conviction that the EU -by acting unilaterally and extraterritorially -had behaved in a deeply inappropriate way. The EU's opponents emphasized the importance of achieving global agreement on how to reduce aviation emissions and argued that the EU's unilateral measure was inconsistent with a range of international agreements and with established norms of customary international law. While it is clear that the EU's opponents often masked their self-interested economic concerns beneath a veneer of righteous indignation, 14 their criticisms nonetheless served to expose a justification deficit in relation to the 'extraterritorial' effect of EU climate change law.
It is in light of this justification deficit that this paper takes shape. It asks a normative question about how far -geographically -the EU's responsibility for climate change should be viewed as extending. It assesses the circumstances in which it is appropriate 13 For a wonderfully well-informed overview see Sandbag, 'Aviation and the EU ETS: What happened in 2012 during "Stop the Clock"' (December 2013). 14 This is borne out by Sandbag's rich analysis, ibid.
for the EU to include extraterritorial GHG emissions within the scope of its climate change law. More specifically, the paper returns to the European Commission's original appropriateness-responsibility frame and uses this to demarcate the geographical extent and limits of EU action on climate change.
III. FIRST-ORDER AND SECOND-ORDER CLIMATE RESPONSIBILITIES
The analysis in this article draws upon a distinction elaborated by the political philosopher Simon Caney between first-order and second-order climate responsibilities. 15 Caney views first-order climate responsibilities as consisting of an agent's obligation to do its 'fair share' to address climate change according to the tenets of 'burden-sharing justice'. 16 However, he does not consider that an agent's climate responsibilities stop there. Because it is inevitable that some agents will fail to comply with the first-order climate responsibilities, he argues that other agents have second-order climate responsibilities that require them to make efforts to induce noncompliant agents to step into line. This might be summed up as 'do your share and encourage/induce others to do theirs to protect the potential victims of climate change.'
According to Caney, second-order climate responsibilities arise for two reasons. On the one hand, they arise because some agents have failed to fulfill their first-order climate responsibilities. These 'non-compliant' first-order agents have, as such, acted inappropriately. On the other hand, they arise because it is incumbent upon secondorder agents to do what they can to minimize the threat of dangerous climate change.
This (moral) obligation arises due to the severity of the negative consequences that 15 S Caney, 'Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harms and Sharing Burdens' (2014) 21(4) Journal of Political Philosophy 125. 16 Ibid, p. 125. The polluter pays principle is one of the principles that is most frequently used as a basis for allocating responsibility between states. One of the merits of Caney's scholarship is that he clarifies the limitations of a pure polluter pays principle-based approach. The UNFCCC incorporates the principle of CBDR which places emphasis upon the scale of a country's contribution to the problem of climate change (responsibility) and the capacity of a country to contribute to tackling the problem (capability (CUP, 2010) . Caney accepts that human rights are just one possible justification for the existence of second-order climate responsibilities.
The prohibition on genocide is considered to be a peremptory norm of international law. 20 Caney, 'Two Kinds of Climate Justice', note 15 above, p. 141. This raises a threshold question and it will be for agents to determine a de minimis threshold below which they consider their efforts not to be worthwhile. In the context of the argument in this paper, agents will be expected to give reasons to explain why they have or have not chosen to exercise second-order climate responsibilities in the light of this. 21 (Giappichelli, 2014) . In this, Nollkaemper unpacks the power/responsibility nexus and examines the role of law in constituting and legitimizing power as well as constraining power. For example, a country's 'market power' will depend ultimately upon the degree of regulatory autonomy that it enjoys under WTO law. He also points out that international law often shields powerful states from incurring international legal responsibility.
way, as encompassing ideational (knowledge shaping) and epistemic (knowledge creation) authority as well as material or structural power linked to the control and mobilization of military, economic and institutional resources (amongst others).
Caney offers us a relatively unconstrained account of second-order climate responsibilities and inducement modalities, although he states that second-order climate responsibilities cease to exist when their exercise would be excessively onerous for the intervening state.
22 By contrast, this paper puts forward a relatively narrow normative claim; arguing that the EU's second-order climate responsibilities make it incumbent upon the EU to use its market power in an effort to induce other agents to comply with their first-order climate responsibilities. 23 The implications and contours of this normative claim are explored in detail below.
First though, it is important to acknowledge the difficulties and dangers inherent in Subject to limited exceptions, a territorial system boundary may be considered to be 'production-based' in that it apportions emissions to the state in which productive activities take place. 27 For example, according to a territorial system boundary, GHG emissions that are generated in the course of producing steel will be apportioned to the country in which the steel is produced rather than the country in which the steel is consumed.
The implications and appropriateness of relying upon a territorial or production-based system boundary has formed the subject of considerable debate in both academic and boundary incur a duty of justification that requires them to put forward compelling reasons to explain why a territorial system boundary should not be regarded as appropriate in the circumstances at hand. This paper argues that there are four situations in which it is appropriate for states to depart from a territorial system boundary when delimiting the geographical scope of their unilateral climate change acts. The first of these situations will be uncontroversial because it is consistent with the IPCC system boundary guidelines.
The second situation involves the plugging of a system boundary gap that has been left by the IPCC's system boundary guidelines. The third and fourth situations entail 33 Some doubts remain whether an importing country may condition access to its market on the exporting country's laws or policies as opposed to the conditions under reasoned departures from these guidelines. While the first three situations as set out in Part V of this paper and should be viewed as involving the exercise of first-order climate responsibilities, the fourth situation that is discussed in Part VI should be viewed as involving the exercise of second-order climate responsibilities.
V. FIRST-ORDER CLIMATE RESPONSIBILITIES A. IPCC-endorsed departures from the territorial system boundary
The IPCC system boundary guidelines endorse departure from a territorial system boundary in a number of strictly defined circumstances. 35 The rationale for these departures is not spelt out.
For example, carbon dioxide emissions from commercial road vehicles are not attributed to the state in which they are generated, but to the state in which the fuel is sold to the end user, even in relation to emissions that are generated outside of that state. So, for example, for a Russian registered lorry that fills up with diesel in the Ukraine before entering Belarus, the GHGs produced in Belarus on that tank of diesel would be apportioned to Ukraine. This departure from a territorial system boundary facilitates effective monitoring, reporting and verification of GHG emissions. It nonetheless only applies to road transport and not in general to other forms of transportation such as aviation and shipping which will be discussed below.
Similarly, emissions that result from fuel that is used in coastal and deep sea fishing are to be allocated to the country delivering the fuel, even where these emissions are generated by vessels operating in the coastal waters of a different country or on the High Seas. It is clear that in areas outside national jurisdiction, such as the High Seas, a territorial system boundary would leave certain GHG emissions outside of the responsibility of any state.
To give just one more example of an IPPC-sanctioned departure from a territorial system boundary; emissions that result from the injection and possible leakage of carbon dioxide stored in geological formations (carbon capture and storage) will be allocated to the country in whose national jurisdiction or by whose international right 35 See note 26 above, Chapter 8.2.1. This is not an exhaustive description of the exceptions set out in Chapter 8.2.1.
the point of injection is located. This will remain the case even in respect of carbon dioxide leaked from a geological formation that crosses a national boundary.
B. System boundary gaps
The IPCC's system boundary remains unsettled as far as international shipping and international aviation are concerned. 36 While a variety of different options have been discussed, to date no international agreement has been achieved. 37 While the IPCC system boundary guidelines provide for the use of fuel consumption data or ship/flight movement data, they do not specify the basis on which fuel consumed or ship/flight movements are to be attributed to states. Hence they do not settle the question of which GHG emissions should be regarded as falling within the first-order climate responsibilities of particular states. Consequently, there is a 'system boundary gap'.
Where the international system boundary remains unsettled or unspecified in this way, states should be viewed as enjoying autonomy in determining how far their firstorder climate responsibilities should geographically extend. They should, however, be required to exercise this autonomy in a manner that is respectful of the autonomy of 36 Ibid, para. 8.2.1, Volume 1 IPCC Guidelines and chapters 3.5 (water borne transportation) & 3.6 (civil aviation) of Volume 2 of the IPCC Guidelines. 37 P Gilbert P & A Bows, 'Exploring the scope for complementary sub-global policy to mitigate CO2 from shipping' (2012) 50 Energy Policy 613 and A Bows-Larkin, 'All adrift: aviation, shipping, and climate change policy' Climate Policy 1. In Table   1 , these authors set out the different apportionment regimes for shipping, breaking these down into producer-based and consumer-based schemes. For example, one way of implementing a consumer-based scheme would involve apportioning responsibility for shipping emissions to the country importing the freight. As with fishing on the High Seas, a territorial approach to apportioning GHG emissions from international aviation and international shipping would leave a significant volume of emissions In this example, it would be open to the EU to decide to exercise first-order climate responsibilities in relation to the worldwide emissions of either EU-departing or EUarriving flights. However, where the EU settles upon a two-way option, including both EU-departing and EU-arriving flights, it should be viewed as exercising secondorder climate responsibilities over either EU-departing or EU-arriving flights.
The design of the Aviation Directive implies a recognition of this on the part of EU.
While this measure was emphatic in its inclusion of EU-departing flights, it was tentative in its inclusion of EU-arriving flights. As noted previously, EU-arriving flights could be exempted from the ETS where they departed from a country that had taken steps to address the climate change impact of these flights. Here, the EU's intervention was rendered conditional or contingent upon the adequacy or otherwise of the climate change measures that had been put in place by another state. A 38 This is not to say that no double-counting will occur because other states may exercise their system boundary autonomy in a different way. It is simply to say that double-counting would not occur if other states were to adopt the same system boundary.
conditional intervention of this kind implies an acceptance by the EU that it is exercising second-order climate responsibilities by acting as a surrogate regulator, 'taking up the slack' 39 in the system because of the regulatory inertia of a more appropriately placed state. We will return to the theme of second-order climate responsibilities below.
C. The nature of the EU policy intervention
The EU deploys a wide variety of different instruments in its efforts to reduce GHG emissions and to mitigate climate change. It can:
• reward low-carbon products by making producer or consumer subsidies available or by setting a mandatory consumption target in relation to these products and/or
• penalize high-carbon products by excluding them from the market or by levying a higher charge upon those who produce them within the framework of the ETS.
These policy instruments can have a considerable impact on the competitive position of different products on the EU market. These initiatives may induce producers of products to favour certain inputs over others or persuade consumers to alter their purchasing preferences. This then raises the question of whether the EU may be viewed as exercising first-order climate responsibilities over extraterritorial GHG emissions specifically because of the nature of the policy intervention that the EU has put in place.
This paper argues that the answer to this question is yes. More particularly, where imported products (goods or services) are accorded a highly privileged position within the EU market as a result of an EU policy intervention that is specifically intended to reward these products due to their climate credentials, the EU should be viewed as exercising first-order climate responsibilities when it regulates the extraterritorial GHG emissions that are embodied within these products. Where the EU voluntarily choses to confer special privileges on products which go beyond those which are 39 A Schwenkenbecher, 'Bridging the Emissions Gap: A Plea for Taking up the Slack' (2013) 3(2) Philosophy and Public Issues 271.
normally available on the EU market, it should be viewed as enjoying special regulatory prerogatives as well. We see a similar dynamic at play in the EU's Generalized System of Preferences which confers additional tariff preferences, and hence a market place advantage, on products that originate in countries that demonstrate compliance with specified international conventions.
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Although it is not unreasonable for the EU to invoke the principle of reciprocity in this way, it is nonetheless far from straightforward to demarcate the outer boundaries of the special regulatory prerogatives that this should entail. After all, virtually all EU climate change legislation will serve to place low-carbon products in a privileged position within the EU market. This paper argues that special privileges should give rise to special regulatory prerogatives in two closely related sets of circumstances, and that in these circumstances it is appropriate for the EU to exercise first-order climate responsibilities in relation to the extraterritorial GHG emissions that are embodied in the imported products concerned.
• Where the EU market for the product in question owes its very existence to an EU policy intervention that is intended to reward 'climate-friendly' products; and
• Where the EU market for the product in question is significantly increased in size as a result of an EU policy intervention that is intended to reward 'climate-friendly' products. Reductions (CERs) within the framework of the Clean Development Mechanism would be an example of a market that would not exist but for an EU public policy intervention that is intended to reward CERs for the positive climate credentials. As a the making available of financial incentives for biofuels, or the entrenchment of a mandatory market share for transport biofuels of 10%, 42 leads to a significant increase in the size of the EU market for transport biofuels, it is appropriate for the EU to include extraterritorial GHG emissions that are embodied within imported biofuels within the scope of its climate change laws. 43 The inclusion of sustainability criteria within the RED can be justified as a result.
The RED also illustrates the kind of safeguard that should be put in place to ensure that the EU does not make place regulatory demands upon imported products that are out of proportion with the advantages that the EU's climate-oriented policy intervention serves to confer. In this example, where suppliers of biofuels that are placed on the EU market decide that they do not want access to financial incentives (subsidies) and that they do not expect their products to be counted towards the EU's mandatory biofuels target, the obligation to comply with the EU's sustainability criteria no longer applies. 44 Hence, it is for the supplier of the product to make an assessment of whether the 'extras' on offer from the EU are sufficiently valuable to persuade it to accept the contention that extraterritorial GHG emissions fall within the EU's first-order climate change responsibilities.
It is, however, important to stress that when a supplier does not accept this contention and chooses to eschew the special market-place advantages on offer, the EU may still be justified in including extraterritorial GHG emissions within the scope of its climate change laws. In this scenario, however, the EU may only do so only when it can justify this as involving the exercise of second-order rather than first-order climate responsibilities. result, according to the argument being made here, it would be appropriate for the EU to exercise first-order climate responsibilities in relation to the market for CERs, thereby justifying the qualitative criteria that the EU has put in place to ensure the authenticity and additionality of the 'foreign' emission reductions that generate the existence of these CERs. Still though the difficulty remains that there is no international agreement regarding which criteria should be used to assess the relative adequacy of a state's mitigation effort. There is therefore a danger that the EU may conduct this evaluation on the basis of criteria that serve to downplay its own share of the global mitigation effort and to exaggerate the effort that is required of other states. It is therefore necessary to introduce safeguards to guard against this danger of abuse. Two such safeguards are elaborated below.
In exercising second-order climate responsibilities, it should be incumbent on the EU to explain the basis upon which it has decided in which sectors to act. In so doing, the EU can refer to all relevant considerations, including the global importance of its 58 The process of submitting intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) to the UNFCCC before the Paris climate summit has just started. The substance of the different submissions can be found here: http://cait2.wri.org/indc/. We will rely upon the World Resources Institute and others to compare the submissions given the differences between them in terms of the annual baseline used, the conditions/contingency written in to them, the inclusion or otherwise of land-use change and many other factors. INDCs are intended to include GHG targets, non-GHG targets and other actions.
domestic market for the product concerned, the overall volume of GHG emissions that are embodied in products (comprising goods and services) sold within its market and the proportion of these emissions that are generated in countries that may be deemed to have failed to fulfill their first-order climate responsibilities. This explanation would be intended to guard against the danger that the EU might choose to exercise second-order climate responsibilities in sectors in which EU industry suffers from competitive disadvantages rather than in sectors in which the EU enjoys significant market power. It would be open to the European Courts, and indeed the dispute settlement bodies of the WTO, to judicially review the explanations proffered by the EU. We see the European Courts performing a similar function when it assesses the legality of the EU's choice of sectors for inclusion in the ETS. 59 In this context, the CJEU has accepted that different sectors can be treated differently so long as this differential treatment is based on an objective and reasonable criterion. 60 The
Court has accepted that the implementation of the ETS can proceed on a step-by-step basis, subject to a requirement that the EU legislature should review the sectoral coverage of the ETS at regular intervals.
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Second, and most importantly, when the EU exercises second-order as opposed to first-order climate responsibilities in relation to extraterritorial GHG emissions it should be required to take the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR) into account. 62 Indeed, this may be considered to be the most important consequence flowing from the distinction between first-order and second-order climate responsibilities. This is because when the EU exercises second-order climate responsibilities, it is entering a jurisdictional space that ought, from the perspective of the IPCC system boundary guidelines, to be occupied by a This principle establishes a common responsibility among states to protect the climate system but sanctions differences among states in their efforts to address climate change. The principle establishes two benchmarks for appraising the relative effort to be made by different states, namely their current and historic contribution to the stock of global GHG in the atmosphere and their relative economic capabilities.
The meaning and implications of the CBDR principle are deeply contested and the inability of states to reach agreement about how this principle should be interpreted and applied is one of the main impediments to achieving progress in multilateral climate negotiations. The task of operationalizing the CBDR principle in the context of unilateral action on climate change raises a host of complex issues, only some of which will be considered here. What is beyond doubt is that when states exercise second-order climate responsibilities, they will enjoy a considerable degree of interpretive autonomy in giving effect to CBDR. While states must exercise this autonomy in a manner which gives full expression to the principle's two core elements -responsibility and capability -they enjoy considerable discretion in determining how these elements should be understood.
We can appreciate the open-ended nature of the principle of CBDR by looking at an 'off-the-peg' web-based climate equity calculator. 63 This recognizes the contested nature of the CBDR principle in that it allows the user to input a range of different parameters, depending upon which premises they wish to underpin their climate equity calculation. For example, users are required to select a mitigation pathway, to determine the relative weight to be accorded to responsibility and capability In implementing the CBDR principle, the EU will have to decide at which stage or stages of its decision-making processes the CBDR principle should be considered to bite. Given that the extent of a state's first-order climate responsibilities will necessarily depend upon its relative responsibility and capability, it seems clear that the CBDR principle must be taken into account by the EU when it assesses whether a state has fulfilled its first-order climate responsibilities. In deciding whether to exercise second-order climate responsibilities, the EU will be obliged to take CBDR into account.
What is less clear is whether the EU should also take this principle into account when it comes to determining the scale or intensity of the regulatory burden to be imposed on products that originate in countries that are deemed to have failed to fulfill their first-order climate responsibilities; that is to say whether the EU should be obliged to take CBDR into account in the manner in which it exercises second-order climate responsibilities. For example, if two countries are deemed to have failed to fulfill their first-order climate responsibilities, but the extent of their first-order responsibilities varies in light of the principle of CBDR, would it be appropriate for the EU to impose different climate change obligations on products that originate in the two countries concerned? Taking the example of the Aviation Directive, this would imply that flights departing from low responsibility-capability countries, would incur an attenuated obligation to surrender emissions allowances within the ETS. For example, flights departing from India for the UK would be required to surrender fewer emission allowances per tonne of carbon dioxide than flights that originate in the United States.
Likewise, steel originating in a low responsibility-capability country would incur less stringent climate mitigation obligations than steel originating in a higher responsibility-capability country and than steel originating within the EU. As this focus upon differentiation suggests, application of the principle of CBDR will inevitably give rise to some difficult issues. Two such issues are here.
First, application of the CBDR principle will necessarily result in the differential treatment of products that originate in different countries. Products originating in countries that have fulfilled their first-order climate responsibility will be excluded from the scope of EU policy whereas products from non-compliant countries will not.
Similarly, products that originate in a low responsibility-capability country may incur attenuated obligations under EU law by comparison with products that originate in a high responsibility-capability state. There is a danger that differentiation of this kind may encourage producers to shift the location of production in order to reap the regulatory benefits that this may entail. This may give rise to (strong) carbon leakage and it conceivable that the volume of global GHG emissions may consequently increase.
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The prospect of carbon leakage presents a dilemma for the EU. On the one hand, differentiation is inherent in the very concept of CBDR as this principle is intended to result in the imposition of lower mitigation burdens on low responsibility-capability states. On the other hand, where there is no absolute, global, GHG emissions ceiling, and where shifts in the place of production can entail an overall increase in global GHG emissions rather than a simple redistribution of the locus of GHG emissions, carbon leakage can threaten to negate the benefits of the mitigation efforts that are made by particular regions or states. Finding a way to guard against carbon leakage, whilst remaining faithful to the principle of CBDR is not an easy task.
One possible solution has been proposed for consideration within the maritime transport sector. 67 This proposal seeks to combine equal treatment with the principle of CBDR. According to this proposal, all ships should be treated equally within the framework of a global ETS, thereby incurring equal obligations regardless of nationality. However, for ships that hold the nationality of a low responsibilitycapability state, the monies that they pay as a result of participation in the ETS should be available for rebate to their flag state. This is indicative of one possible approach that the EU could consider in a bid to reconcile climate equity and climate effectiveness in energy-intensive sectors of the economy where there is compelling evidence that a significant risk of carbon leakage exists. http://www.un-ngls.org/IMG/pdf/IMERS_Rebate_Mechanism_proposal.pdf.
The second issue arising as a result of the imposition of differentiated obligations on products originating in different countries concerns the compatibility of such differentiation with WTO law. It may be suggested that this gives rise to MostFavoured-Nation discrimination because products imported into the EU from country X would be treated differently from products imported from country Y.
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The WTO Appellate Body (AB) has in the past adopted an understanding of the nondiscrimination principle which leaves room for differential treatment in certain circumstances, without even having to rely on one of the explicit exceptions to the non-discrimination principle that the WTO Agreement lays down. This is mot apparent in the AB's EC -Tariff Preferences (GSP) report. 69 Here, the AB confronted a choice between what it characterized as a 'neutral' understanding of discrimination and a 'negative' understanding of discrimination. Whereas a neutral understanding regards the making of a distinction as sufficient to ground a finding of discrimination, a negative understanding carries 'the connotation of a distinction that is unjust or prejudicial'. 70 The AB favoured a 'negative' understanding in the circumstances of this case, thereby leaving room for positive action in favour of developing countries.
The implication of the AB's preference for a negative understanding of discrimination led it to accept that the EU was, as a matter of principle, entitled to treat different developing countries differently without this necessarily amounting to unlawful discrimination contrary to the most-favoured-nation principle. More precisely, the AB 68 This analysis assumes that the EU would not impose harsher burdens on any imported products than it imposes on like EU products and that therefore national treatment discrimination under GATT, Article III or TBT, Article 2.1 would not occur. 69 
EC -Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (DS246/AB/R). See also United States -Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain
Shrimp Products (DS58/AB/R) where the AB observed at para. 165 that '[w]e believe that discrimination results not only when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when the application of the measure at issue
does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries.' 70 Ibid DS246, para. 152.
accepted that it would not necessarily amount to discrimination for the EU to grant additional tariff preferences to certain developing countries and to deny these preferences to other developing countries; so long as the EU was responding positively to the different development, financial and trade needs of the different developing countries concerned.
On the contrary, the EU was only required to ensure that similarly-situated developing countries received identical treatment. 71 As such, the EU was required to make an objective assessment of the development, financial and trade needs of the different countries and to do so by reference to an objective standard. 'Broad-based recognition of a particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations, could serve as such a standard'. 72 As the EU had not identified criteria or standards to provide a basis for distinguishing between different developing countries, the AB concluded that there was no basis to determine whether the EU's measure was substantively discriminatory or not. As the burden of proof rested upon the EU in the particular circumstances of this case, the EU was deemed to have failed to prove that its measure satisfied the non-discrimination test.
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While the EU was found to have acted in breach of WTO law in the GSP case, the reasoning of the AB is encouraging from a climate change differentiation point of view. It suggests strongly that differently situated countries (and the products coming from them) can be treated differently without this amounting to discrimination so long as a number of conditions are met. Perhaps the most important of these conditions is the requirement that differentiation be based upon an objective standard, and that multilateral instruments are capable of providing a standard of this kind. While the principle of CBDR is open-ended and contested in its contours and implications, the UNFCCC is unequivocal in endorsing responsibility and capability as the applicable standards to be applied in assessing the relative contribution to be made by states.
Thus, so long as the EU has clear criteria for assessing the relative responsibilities and capabilities of states, and so long as it applies these criteria in a manner which is consistent and transparent, there is every reason to believe that differentiation 71 Ibid, para. 173.
72 Ibid, para. 163.
73 Ibid, para. 183.
between countries which are not similarly situated would not be regarded by the WTO Appellate Body as giving rise to discrimination in WTO law.
VII. WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES OF A RESPONSIBILITY-BASED FRAME?
This article has proposed a new framework to evaluate and delimit the geographical boundaries of EU climate change law. A number of advantages associated with this framework are spelt out here.
First, the proposed framework recognises the importance of the IPCC's 2006 system boundary guidelines and the normative salience of regulatory initiatives that may be though to depart from these or from other established norms of international law.
Although these guidelines are flawed and incomplete for the reasons discussed above, they have been endorsed by nearly two hundred parties to the UNFCCC. As such, when states depart from these guidelines, they are seeking to alter the internationally agreed system boundary and they are engaging in what amounts potentially to a normtransforming act. As scholars writing in the constructivist tradition have emphasized, when agents seek to challenge or to promote the transformation of existing norms, they will almost always confront a difficult task. 'To challenge existing logics of appropriateness, activists may need to be explicitly "inappropriate"', 74 and consequently to work hard to persuade other agents, including powerful states, of the appropriateness of the putative normative change. Although it may seem tempting to deny that particular behavior presents a challenge to existing normative frameworks, this act of denial will deprive the actor in question of the opportunity to explain or justify why it considers it to be appropriate to promote an adjustment of existing norms or a new interpretation of them. The actor will forego the opportunity to persuade.
We saw this in relation to the EU's Aviation Directive where arguments from appropriateness and arguments from consequences clashed, generating considerable noise but mutual incomprehension rather than a meeting of minds. Had it been adopted, it would have resulted in the inclusion within the ETS of GHG emissions generated within EU airspace. For this first time, the Commission accepted that CBDR is relevant in this setting and proposed to exempt GHG emissions from developing countries whose share of total revenue ton kilometres of international civil aviation activities is less than 1%. Developing countries would include countries not Third, a responsibility-based frame helps us to draw principled distinctions between different measures that encompass extraterritorial GHG emissions within their scope.
It allows us to classify these measures according to their relationship with the IPCC system boundary guidelines and to appreciate the very different premises that underpin climate change 'extraterritoriality' depending upon the nature of this relationship. Whereas some such measures are in conformity with the IPCC system boundary guidelines or serve to fill a system boundary gap, other measures seek to unsettle the internationally agreed system boundary by asserting responsibility over GHG emissions that these guidelines would attribute to other states. It seems reasonable to assert that countries should bear a more onerous burden of justification when they adopt measures that depart from the IPCC system boundary in this way.
In keeping with this, it becomes possible to locate individual measures on a spectrum of climate change 'extraterritoriality', 82 depending upon their relationship to the IPCC system boundary guidelines. As we move along the spectrum from measures in conformity with the IPCC system boundary on the one hand, to measures that involve the exercise of second-order climate responsibilities on the other, the intensity of the norm transformation pursued by the relevant measure would seem to increase. This is illuminating as far as the EU's Aviation Directive is concerned. As was previously noted, there is a system boundary gap in relation to international aviation and international shipping. In principle, it should therefore be relatively uncontroversial for the EU to take steps to fill this system boundary gap. Had the EU filled this system boundary gap in a manner that satisfied the replication test that was set out above, 83 the resulting measure would have been located towards the 'modest' norm transformation end of the spectrum of climate change 'extraterritoriality'.
However, by endorsing a two-way system boundary, including both departing and 82 I have put this term in inverted commas to reflect the fact that import restrictions that target extraterritorial GHG emissions are not really extraterritorial as such because their application is triggered by the existence of a territorial connection with the importing state, namely access to that state's market. 83 Recall note 38 above. That is to say that the system boundary selected would not result in double-counting of GHG emissions if it were replicated by all other states or internationally.
(provisionally) arriving flights, the Aviation Directive also came to involve the exercise of second-order climate responsibilities. As such, its position on the spectrum of climate change 'extraterritoriality' changed, with the measure seeking to provoke a more profound degree of normative change.
Fourth, the responsibility framework developed and applied in this article offers important insights for judicial and quasi-judicial bodies that are called upon to assess the lawfulness of unilateral measures that include extraterritorial GHG emissions within their scope. 84 It would assist these bodies to situate individual measures on the spectrum of climate change 'extraterritoriality' as was explained above, allowing them to impose a more robust burden of justification in relation to measures that involve the exercise of second-order climate responsibilities and to develop appropriate conditions and constraints in relation to these measures to guard against abuse.
For example, it would fall to courts to apply the reasonable system boundary (or replication) test in relation to measures which seek to fill an international system boundary gap. 85 It would likewise be for courts to ensure that measures which involve the exercise of second-order climate responsibilities respect the principle of CBDR, and to verify that appropriate criteria for assessing whether states have fulfilled their first-order responsibilities have been identified and consistently applied.
As such, the responsibility framework is suggestive of a role for courts that is more searching than that assumed by the CJEU when it assessed the legality of the EU's 84 See also E. In providing an affirmative answer to this question, the CJEU emphasized three points. First, it stressed the existence of a territorial nexus between the EU and its object of regulation, namely EU-departing and EU-arriving flights. It emphasized that when an aircraft is within the territory of an EU Member State, it is subject to the 'unlimited jurisdiction of that Member State'. 87 Second, and in the same vein, the CJEU insisted that it acceptable for the EU to make the conduct of a commercial activity within its territory conditional upon compliance with criteria established by EU law, where these criteria are intended to fulfill the environmental protection objectives that the EU has set for itself. 88 Third, the CJEU insisted that the full application of EU law within its territory is not called into question by 'the fact that…certain matters contributing to pollution [in the EU] originate in an event which occurs partly outside.
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As such, the CJEU emphasized territory, EU regulatory autonomy and the existence of cross-border environmental effects. It did not spell out the relationship between these three considerations or specify which of these is a necessary or sufficient condition for legality. More particularly, the Court's reasoning created ambiguity about whether the capacity of extraterritorial conduct to generate EU-felt effects is a precondition for the inclusion of foreign conduct within the scope of EU law. boundary guidelines, consider the position of international aviation within these or reflect on how much authority, if any, these guidelines should enjoy. The Court's judgment is thinly reasoned and it hides behind the existence of a territorial nexus to downplay the novelty of the question that had been raised. The analysis provided in this paper is intended to assist the CJEU and other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies by providing a normative framework for delimiting the circumstances in which, and the conditions according to which, it should be considered lawful for the EU to include extraterritorial GHG emissions within the scope of its climate change laws.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has brought together literature on climate change justice and the international legal framework for apportioning GHG emissions among states in order to develop a set of proposals to demarcate the geographical extent of the EU's firstorder and second-order climate responsibilities. While the EU's decision to give broad geographical scope to its Aviation Directive was framed according to a logic of consequences, this paper has shown that, subject to complying with the safeguards that constrain the exercise of second-order climate responsibilities, this measure could have been justified on the basis of a logic of appropriateness as well.
The paper has argued that there are four situations in which it is appropriate for the EU to include extraterritorial GHG emissions within the scope of its climate change law. While three of these involve the exercise of first-order climate responsibilities, the fourth involves the exercise of second-order climate responsibilities. These four situations are summarized in the table below: The paper has argued that the distinction between first-order and second-order climate responsibilities has important implications in relation to the regulation of extraterritorial GHG emissions, especially when it comes to determining the relevance of the principle of CBDR.
This paper has used the term 'responsibility' to connote moral rather than legal responsibility. 90 Therefore the argument put forward in this paper does not rest upon a 90 For an excellent discussion of the question of legal responsibility (or liability) under claim that a state that has failed to discharge its first-order climate responsibilities has breached a legal obligation grounded in international law. Similarly, it is not premised upon the suggestion that states with second-order climate responsibilities incur a legally binding obligation to act. This, however, is not to say that this discussion of climate change responsibilities is irrelevant as a matter of law. The paper accepts that the existing international legal framework for apportioning GHG emissions among states, though not formally binding in relation to unilateral acts, should provide the starting point for an analysis of a state's moral responsibilities. Also, the nature and extent of a state's moral responsibilities should be viewed as of paramount importance in appraising the lawfulness of a state's decision to include extraterritorial GHG emissions within the scope of its climate change laws. In keeping with this, this paper has sought to provide guidance to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies within the EU and the WTO to assist them in delimiting the circumstances in which it should be considered lawful for states to extend the global reach of their climate change laws.
This paper has set out many arguments in favour of adopting a responsibility-based framework for assessing how, far geographically, the EU's climate change responsibilities extend. One of the key advantages of this approach is that it allows us very vague benchmarks for apportioning legal responsibility to states, at least for countries that have not accepted emission reduction commitments under the amended Kyoto Protocol. Recall notes 45-47 above. It would interesting to consider how the arguments put forward in this paper concerning second-order climate responsibilities would play out against the backdrop of a finding of legal responsibility as a matter of public international law, including in relation to the international law of state responsibility. But this would be the topic for another paper. From the perspective of state responsibility, one of the crucial things to recognize in relation to the discussion here is that if the EU were to use its market power as a way of exercising secondorder climate responsibilities in response to a breach of an international legal obligation by another state, there would be a strong argument in favour of the proposition that the EU measures should be viewed as acts of retortion rather than acts of reprisal. This is a fortiori the case if the moral argument put forward in this paper is allowed to influence the interpretation of positive law, especially within the framework of the WTO.
to distinguish between different measures that include extraterritorial GHG emissions within their scope; and to situate these measures on a spectrum of climate change 'extraterritoriality'. This approach serves also to shine a bright light on the question of whether the EU, a self-proclaimed global climate leader, has in fact fulfilled its own first-order climate responsibilities, when judged in absolute as well as in relative terms.
While this paper has endorsed a 'logic of appropriateness' in seeking to identify the geographical limits of EU climate change law, there is much to be said in favour of the climate change consequences that would result as well. While this paper has attached importance to the climate change system boundary constructed by the IPCC and endorsed by parties to the UNFCCC, it has not done so in a way that would invariably preclude the EU from including extraterritorial GHG emissions within the scope of its climate change laws. The logic of appropriateness that is defended in this paper therefore favours action over inaction and creates space for action-forcing contingent unilateralism. At the same time, however, it seeks to introduce conditions and constraints to guard against the danger that powerful agents -such as the EUmay use their market power to offload some of their own climate change responsibilities onto other, often less affluent, states.
